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I Introduction
Romer (2000) provides an alternative model to the AS/AD and IS/LM models that
abandons the LM schedule and recognizes that the short-term interest rate is set by
central banks. Such a framework acknowledges the critical role of the central bank in
determining short-term interest rates, moving mainstream macroeconomics closer to Post
Keynesian monetary theory. However, Romer’s framework leaves the role of the
financial sector and bank lending invisible, and these are features Post Keynesians have
long argued are central to monetary macroeconomics.
The current paper presents an alternative Post Keynesian construction of
macroeconomics without an LM schedule, the key analytic feature of which is to replace
the money market with the loan market. This sharply distinguishes the Post Keynesian
approach from the neo-Keynesian ISLM approach. It is not an exogenous interest rate
that is the defining difference: it is the role of banks and bank lending.
The model makes transparently clear the macroeconomic significance of the loan
market and bank behavior, and has an endogenous money supply that is driven by bank
lending. If banks become more optimistic over the cycle and lower their interest rate
mark-up, that increases the likelihood of instability.
A second difference from Romer is that rather than having a natural level of
output and a vertical Phillips curve, the model allows equilibrium output to vary and
there is an inflation – output trade-off. That makes the model explicitly Keynesian.
Finally, like Romer, the model is a closed economy model. That constitutes the
starting point, and expanding it to an open economy context to take account of
globalization is a future step. However, whether there are significant novel theoretical (as
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opposed to policy) implications from globalization for Post Keynesian macroeconomics
remains unclear and awaits further theoretical articulation.
II The basic model
One challenge in analyzing the financial sector and monetary policy is to avoid
conflating financial sector issues with real sector issues. The economy consists of a
financial and real sector, and they interact as shown in Figure 1. Thus, price and quantity
developments in the financial sector affect outcomes in the real sector, and vice-versa.
This interaction makes it important to distinguish effects caused by the specification of
the financial sector from effects due to the specification of the real sector.
The focus of the current paper is on the operation of the financial sector, and to
avoid conflating financial and real sector effects the paper adopts a simple textbook
Keynesian description of the real sector. In particular, this means excluding income
distribution effects arising from changes in worker bargaining power, which have been a
major focus of Post Keynesian research regarding the real sector.
The basic model consists of a goods market and a financial sector. The goods
market is governed by a standard Keynesian closure in which output adjusts to equal
aggregate demand, as follows:
(1) y = E
(2) E = E(y, iL, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2, . ) Ey > 0, EiL< 0, EB > 0, EL< 0, ED> 0,
EA1 > 0, EA2 > 0
Where y = output, E = aggregate demand (AD), iL = loan interest rate, B = new
borrowing, L-1 = last period’s stock of debt, D-1 = last period’s stock of bank deposits, A1
= pure shock to animal spirits, and A2 = joint shock to animal spirits and liquidity
3

preference. For the time being the assumption is that inflation is zero. Income, borrowing,
and the stock of debt are in real terms and are deflated by the price level (which can be
thought of as normalized at unity). The assumed signs of the partial derivatives of the
arguments of the AD function are as indicated.
Equation (1) is the goods market clearing condition, while equation (2) specifies
the AD function. The level of AD depends positively on the flow of new borrowing. New
borrowing finances spending: loan repayments lower spending. New borrowing adds to
outstanding debt, which has a negative impact on next period spending. However, new
borrowing also creates bank deposits through the lending activities of banks, and that
adds to wealth and increases AD.
The financial sector is described by the following set of equations
(3) B = L – L-1
(4) L = L(iL, y, A1, A2)

LiL < 0, Ly > 0, LA1 > 0, LA2 > 0

(5) iL = iF + m(A3, A4, … )

iF > 0,m(.) > 0, mA3 > 0, mA4 > 0

(6) A3 = αA2

α<0

Where L = loan demand, iL = bank loan market interest rate, iF = money market interest
rate, m = interest rate spread between money market rate and loan rate, A3 = joint animal
spirits – liquidity preference shock, and A4 = pure financial sector liquidity preference
shock.
Equation (3) defines new borrowing. Equation (4) specifies loan demand, which
depends negatively on the loan interest rate and positively on the level of income. The
two animal spirits shocks positively impact loan demand. Equation (5) determines the
market interest rate in terms of a spread over the money market rate. It can be thought of
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as the bank mark-up, and this spread depends on the liquidity preference of financial
institutions. This liquidity preference captures the state of financial market confidence
and assessments of risk. The money market interest rate is exogenously set by the central
bank. Equation (6) specifies the joint liquidity preference – animal spirits shock.
There are three types of shock. A1 is a pure “animal spirits” goods market shock
that only affects spending. Its impact is positive. A4 is a pure financial sector liquidity
preference shock that only affects credit market spreads. Its impact is to raise the spread.
A2 and A3 are joint animal spirits – liquidity preference shocks that affect both the
goods market and the financial sector. The animal spirits shock raises confidence and AD
and it simultaneously reduces liquidity preference (i.e. increases the confidence of
banks), which lowers interest spreads. This pattern is a structural co-movement and not
statistical covariance, and it reflects how changes in confidence that affect real spending
can be mirrored in financial sector behavior.
The structural connection between liquidity preference and animal spirits has been
emphasized by Kregel (1984/5) who sees them as two sides of the same coin. There is
also a parallel with Davidson’s (1965) treatment of Keynes’ finance motive as increases
in animal spirits increase the finance demand for money. Consequently, positive shocks
to effective demand are structurally linked to positive shocks in the financial sector. The
neo-Keynesian ISLM model’s failure to capture these structural connections and its
representation of them as statistical co-variances was a major failing of the model.
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Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the short run level of output. Combining
equations (1) and (2) yields the familiar IS schedule. 1 The financial sector, represented by
equation (5), determines the loan rate. The loan rate then affects the level of AD, thereby
influencing the level of output.
The comparative statics of the basic model are given by
dy/diF < 0

diL/diF > 0

dy/dA1> 0

diL/dA1= 0

dy/dA2 > 0

diL/dA2 < 0

dy/dA4 < 0

diL/dA4 > 0

Increases in the policy interest rate lower income and raise the loan rate. Pure animal
spirits shocks (A1) raise income and have no affect on the loan rate. Pure liquidity
preference shocks (A4) raise the interest rate and lower income. Joint animal spirits liquidity preference shocks (A2) raise income and lower rates, a pattern that is hard to
generate and explain within the conventional neo-Keynesian ISLM model. This
illustrates the importance of such shocks.
III Endogenizing bank mark-ups and credit spreads
In the previous section the bank mark-up/credit spread was unaffected by the level
of economic activity and lending. However, bank mark-ups may respond endogenously
to real and financial sector developments. In this case the loan rate can be re-specified as
(5’) iL = iF + m(L(iL, y, A1, A2), y, A3, A4, …)
1

mL > 0, mY < 0

For most Post Keynesians the major failing of the ISLM model is its treatment of the financial sector in
terms of an LM schedule that lacks reference to bank lending and endogenous money. A smaller group of
Post Keynesians associated with the Cambridge U.K. school also question the IS schedule, believing it may
be upward sloping due to capital re-switching effects. However, empirical estimates of aggregate effective
demand find a negative relation with real interest rates, and that is the assumption built into equation (2).
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Equation (5’) has the credit spread responding positively to the level of lending and
negatively to the level of income.
The positive response to lending is consistent with both the structuralist (Palley,
1987/88; Pollin, 1991) and horizontalist (Wray, 1991; Lavoie, 1996) views of
endogenous money. According to structuralists, credit markets can become congested
owing to financing limitations of individual firms and limited portfolio demands on part
of banks and others to hold loans. According to horizontalists, spreads may also increase
due to the worsening credit quality of marginal borrowers as the loan pool grows – an
argument that is also supported by structuralists.
The interest rate spread or mark-up can also fall in response to expansions of
income. This reflects a Minskyian psychological channel whereby economic expansions
improve the “confidence” of lenders and investors, leading them to lower required risk
premiums. Such an outcome might be associated with the transition from hedge to
speculative finance (Minsky, 1975, 1986).
The reduced form of equation (5’) yields a mark-up given by
(5”) iL = iF + m(y, A1, A2, A3, A4)

mY >< 0

The interesting and novel feature is that the bank mark-up may therefore rise or fall with
income. It rises if the loan volume effect dominates and falls if the Minskyian confidence
effect dominates. The loan volume effect refers to the impact of credit market congestion
and/or deteriorating borrower quality.
The bank loan rate schedule given by equation (5”) constitutes an effective loan
supply schedule as it determines the terms on which credit is made available. In a Post
Keynesian monetary framework loan demand and the bank loan rate schedule are the
7

critical determinants of interest rates. This contrasts with the neo-Keynesian ISLM model
that emphasizes the role of money supply and money demand. From a Post Keynesian
perspective the LM schedule (liquidity – money) is replaced by an LL schedule (liquidity
– loans).
Figures 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c show three different LL schedules derived under different
assumptions about the behavior of bank mark-ups and credit spreads. Figure 3.a assumes
that credit spreads are exogenously fixed, generating a horizontal LL schedule. Figure 3.b
assumes that credit spreads rise with income, generating a positively sloped LL schedule.
Figure 3.c assumes that credit spreads fall with increases in income, generating a
negatively sloped LL schedule.
The short run equilibrium level of output is then determined by combining the IS
and LL schedules, which are given respectively by
(6.a) y = E(iL, L-1, D-1, A1, A2)
(6.b) iL = iF + m(y, A1, αA2, A4)
Graphically, the short run equilibrium output and interest rate are determined by the
intersection of the IS and LL schedules drawn in loan rate – output space. Figure 4 shows
the determination of equilibrium for the case where the IS schedule is negatively sloped
and the LL schedule is positively sloped.
If the Minskyian confidence effect on the loan mark-up dominates the loan
volume effect, the LL schedule is negatively sloped. If the LL schedule is more
negatively sloped than the IS schedule, it is easy to intuit that the economy might be
unstable. This is because increases in AD cause expansions in income that in turn raise
financial market confidence, which lowers the loan interest rate. That in turn causes a
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further expansion in AD and output. This pattern fits with Minsky’s (1992) description of
his financial instability hypothesis.
IV Monetary aggregates in the Post Keynesian model
Whereas the ISLM model has the money supply determined by the money
multiplier, Post Keynesian endogenous money theory emphasizes the loan multiplier
(Coghlan, 1978). This reflects a reversal of causation whereby it is loans that create
deposits rather than deposits creating loans.
The operation of the loan multiplier and the determination of the money supply
can be described by adding the following equations describing the banking sector.
(7) L +R = D
(8) R = kD

0<k<1

(9) L = L(iL, y, ..)
(10) D = D(iD, y, q)

DiD > 0, Dy > 0, Dq > 0

(11) iF =[1 + k]βiD

β>1

Where R = required reserves, D = demand deposits, k = required reserve ratio for
deposits, q = equity prices, and iD = interest rate on deposits.
Equation (7) is the banking sector’s balance sheet constraint. Equation (8)
determines required reserve holdings. Equation (9) is the aggregate loan demand
function. Equation (10) is the demand for bank deposits (i.e. money demand). It is a
positive function of the deposit interest rate and income. It is also a positive function of
stock prices, reflecting that when stock prices are higher stock dividend yields are lower,
making bank deposits relatively more attractive. Finally, equation (11) links the deposit
rate to the money market rate. Deposits and money market borrowing are both sources of
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funds to individual banks, and they therefore equalize the marginal costs of these funding
sources (Palley, 1987/88). The cost of deposits includes the reserve requirement that must
be held on each dollar of deposits (k) plus administrative costs (β). Hence the true cost of
deposits is the interest rate (iD) scaled up to incorporate reserve requirement and
administration costs.
Combining equations (7) and (8) and rearranging yields
(12) L = [1-k]D
Where [1-k] is the loan multiplier. Loans create deposits that are then loaned out by
banks. The amount that can be re-loaned depends on the reserve requirement ratio that
determines how much of each deposit the banks must retain. A higher reserve
requirement ratio (k) therefore lowers the multiplier as banks must hold on to more of
each deposit.
First differencing equation (12) provides the relation between loan creation, new
borrowing, and deposit creation, which is as follows
(13) L – L-1= B = [1-k][D – D-1]
Figure 4 shows the determination of the money supply and stock prices for a
given level of income. The northeast quadrant describes the loan market in which banks
satisfy all loan demand at the loan interest rate that is a mark-up over the money market
rate. The southeast panel shows the loan multiplier, and it determines the money supply.
The northwest panel constitutes the money market, which works as follows. The
banking system determines the money supply via the volume of lending, and the money
(deposits) that is created must be willingly held (Goodhart, 1989; Palley, 1991; Howells,
1995). Money demand is therefore brought into alignment with money supply through
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equity price adjustment. If agents have excess money balances, they buy equities. This
drives up equity prices until they are content to hold the existing stock of deposits. This
equilibrating process results in a positive relationship between the money supply and
equity prices. Thus, increases in bank lending that increase the money supply (stock of
deposits) generate an increase in equity prices.
Note, as currently specified, the money market, money demand and equity prices
are separable from rest of model, given by the IS and LL equations that summarize the
real sector and the banking sector. This simplifies presentation of the model by keeping it
to a two dimensional space. However, if equity prices are added as arguments of the AD
and loan demand functions, the model becomes a simultaneous Post Keynesian short run
general equilibrium model determining outcomes in the goods market, the loan market,
and the money market. 2 That makes it difficult to represent graphically as there are three
endogenous variables: income (y), the loan rate (iL), and stock prices (q).
Analytically, the significance of making AD depend positively on stock prices is
to make the effects of endogenous money more expansionary. This is because increased
lending expands the money supply, causing stock prices to rise, which in turn further
increases AD and output.
V Adding inflation
Inflation is an important part of the economic environment, and the model can be
expanded to include its effects. Introducing inflation introduces a distinction between
nominal and real interest rates. The financial sector determines the nominal interest rate
2

The rationale for AD depending on equity prices would be a stock market wealth effect, which would
make AD a positive function of q. The rationale for loan demand depending on equity prices is that firms
might shift to equity financing when equity prices are high and the cost of equity capital low, thereby
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while goods market decisions depend on the real rate.
This pattern can be captured by adding an equation for the real interest rate and
re-specifying AD as follows
(2’) E = E(y, rL, π, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2, … )

Eπ > 0

(14) rL = iL – π
where rL = real interest rate and π = inflation rate. Inflation has two expansionary effects
on AD. First, it lowers the real interest rate via equation (14). Second, it causes agents to
bring forward spending plans in anticipation of higher prices, which raises AD via
equation (2’).
Figure 5 shows the basic model of the goods market amended to include the effect
of inflation. There are now two interest rates – the nominal and the real – to be
determined, along with the level of output. Banks set a nominal interest rate that is a
mark-up over the nominal money market rate that is set by the monetary authority. Given
the rate of inflation, this bank nominal loan rate then determines a real interest rate that
determines AD, which in turn determines output in the goods market.
The money market and stock market will also be affected by inflation because
inflation affects money demand. This can be captured by re-specifying the demand for
deposits to include inflation as an argument, as follows:
(10’) D = D(iD, π. y, q)

DiD > 0, Dπ < 0. Dy > 0, Dq > 0

According to this specification inflation reduces the demand for deposits as it is akin to a
tax on money. Holders of deposits therefore try to switch out of them by buying equity,
which drives up equity prices. However, the stock of deposits is determined by bank
making loan demand a negative function of q.
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lending so that trying to switch out of deposits by buying equity does not reduce the
money supply. Instead, equity prices must increase so that the dividend yield falls until
agents are willing to hold the money balances created by the banking system’s lending
activity.
VI Adding monetary policy
Monetary policy operates through the money market rate that the central bank
controls. In the U.S. this rate is the federal funds rate. Policy can be conceptualized as the
monetary authority setting a nominal money market interest rate with the goal of hitting
output target, y*. This implies a target money market rate of
(15) iF* = E-1(y*, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - π, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )
The economic logic behind the target selection rests on the monetary authority working
backward from its output target to an interest rate setting consistent with hitting that
target.
Thus, a given output target implies a needed level of AD. Given the parameters of
AD that implies a needed real loan rate. Given the inflation rate, that implies a needed
nominal loan rate. Given the parameters of the banking sector’s mark-up, that nominal
loan rate implies a needed nominal money market rate, which is the target interest rate.
The target money market rate is a negative function of the output target (y*), a
negative function of banks’ mark-up (m), and a positive function of inflation (π). It is also
a positive function of factors that increase AD, and a negative function of factors that
decrease AD.
VII Endogenizing inflation
So far inflation has been taken as given. However, inflation can be endogenized
13

by adding a Phillips curve, which can be either a demand-pull or a conflict inflation
Phillips curve.
A simple linear version of the Phillips curve is given by
(15) π = a0 + a1y
Equation (15) implies that inflation is a positive function of the level of output. A
straightforward implication of such a Phillips curve is that targeting the level of output is
equivalent to targeting a particular rate of inflation.
Given the above Phillips curve, the nominal interest rate target becomes
(15’) iF* = E-1(y*, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - π, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )
= E-1(y*, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - a0 - a1y*, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )
where y*= the target output level. Alternatively, the target interest rate can be expressed
in terms of a target inflation rate as follows
(15”) iF* = E-1(y, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) – π*, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )
= E-1([π* - a0]/a1, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - π*, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )
where π* = a0 + a1y*. Endogenizing inflation therefore results in a nominal interest rate
policy rule that can be expressed as a function of either an output target or an inflation
target.
From a Post Keynesian perspective inflation targeting is equivalent to output
targeting. The problem is that inflation targeting obscures that reality, and by obscuring
that reality can result in sub-optimal policy choices. Thus, because inflation is a bad,
policy makers may lean toward a sub-optimally low inflation target with significant
output losses if they are unaware of the fact that an inflation target is also implicitly an
output target. That is why inflation targeting is an undesirable public policy frame
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(Palley, 2007).
The interest rate policy functions given by equations (15’) and (15”) can be
represented in both output – interest rate space and inflation - interest rate space, and the
reaction functions trace out the nominal money market interest rate required to hit a target
level of output or inflation. The nominal money market interest rate then implies a
nominal loan market rate and a real interest rate.
These interest rate functions are conditional on the state of AD and the Phillips
curve, and changes in variables affecting AD or the parameters of the Phillips curve shift
these functions. For instance, an increase in goods market animal spirits (A1) will shift
the interest rate functions up. The economic logic is that the higher animal spirits increase
AD, calling for a lower target interest rate to hit any level of output.
An increase in bank liquidity preference (A4) will shift the interest rate functions
down. The logic is that increased bank liquidity preference raises credit market spreads
and the market real interest rate. To hit a given output target policy must therefore lower
the real rate, which calls for a downward shift of the nominal interest rate policy function.
Lastly, an adverse shift in the Phillips curve will shift up the nominal interest rate
policy function. The logic is that each output level is now associated with a higher rate of
inflation. To maintain the real interest rate consistent with any given output target, the
nominal policy rate must rise. Consequently the policy interest rate function shifts up
along its entirety.
The slope of the nominal interest rate policy function is ambiguous, and it can be
positively or negatively sloped with respect to output. This ambiguity is because the
required nominal interest rate is subject to conflicting forces. On one hand, an increase in
15

the output target needs a lower real interest rate that calls for a lower nominal rate. On the
other hand, an increase in the output target raises inflation which calls for a higher
nominal rate to prevent excessive reduction in the real rate.
There are three factors affecting the slope of the policy interest rate function: 1)
the interest sensitivity of AD; 2) the slope of the Phillips curve; and 3) the behavior of the
bank mark-up.
The policy interest rate function will tend to be positively sloped in output –
interest rate space if 1) AD is sensitive to the real interest rate, 2) the Phillips curve is
steep so that inflation rises rapidly with output, and 3) the credit spread is insensitive to
output or even narrows with output. In this case, the central bank will need to raise
nominal interest rates with output to stop the real rate from falling too far.
The nominal interest rate policy function will tend to be negatively sloped in
output – interest rate space if 1) AD is in sensitive to the real interest rate, 2) the Phillips
curve is relatively flat, and 3) the credit spread is increases with output. In this case, the
central bank will need to lower nominal interest rates with output in order to lower the
real rate and sustain a level of AD consistent with a higher output target.
The slope of the nominal interest rate policy function can give rise to interesting
dynamics of interest rate adjustment when the monetary authority changes its output
target. Thus, suppose the authority raises its output target, and therefore lowers its
nominal policy rate to stimulate demand. Given the initial inflation rate, this lowers the
real interest rate, causing output and inflation to increase. As inflation increases, the
monetary authority may then need to start raising the nominal rate to achieve the real rate
consistent with the new output target.
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VII Stability analysis
Thus far the analysis has focused on static equilibrium outcomes and comparative
static effects. The appendix provides a simple linear version of the model with a
Keynesian dynamic adjustment equation of the form
(16)

Δy = ψ[E-1 – y-1]

0< ψ<1

According to this adjustment mechanism output responds to last period’s excess demand
conditions, partially closing the gap in the current period. If ψ is large, then the output
response to excess demand is large: if ψ is small, the reverse holds.
Given such an adjustment mechanism the linear system of equations reduces to a
second order difference equation in output. As is well known, such an equation can
generate convergent (stable) or divergent (unstable) outcomes, and the current model fits
this pattern.
However, it is worth considering the case where (a) the Minsky confidence effect
dominates the loan congestion effect (my < 0) so that the loan rate mark-up falls as output
expands; (b) new borrowing has a large positive impact on AD (EB is large); and (c) the
absolute value of the AD wealth effect of bank deposits and bank loans is the same (|EL| =
|ED|). In this event one of the necessary stability conditions may be violated so that the
model is unstable.
The economic logic is simple. New borrowing strongly expands AD and output,
causing the loan rate mark-up and the loan rate to fall, in turn generating further
expansion of AD and output. Such a process is the hallmark of a Minskyian business
cycle.
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Lastly, if AD is strongly sensitive to inflation (Eπ is large) this also increases the
likelihood of instability. That is because of the Tobin –Mundell effect (Tobin 1965, 1975)
whereby inflation causes agents to shift away from money and increase spending, thereby
further increasing AD and inflation.
VIII Conclusion
This paper has presented a macro model of economy that incorporates a Post
Keynesian construction of the financial sector. The key analytic feature of the model that
distinguishes it from the neo-Keynesian ISLM model is replacement of the money market
with the loan market. The model makes transparently clear the macroeconomic
significance of the loan market and bank behavior, and has an endogenous money supply
that is driven by bank lending. If banks become more optimistic over the cycle and lower
their mark-up, that increases the likelihood of instability.
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Appendix
This appendix explores the dynamic stability properties of a linear version of the model
developed in the main body of the paper. The linear model is given by the following
equations:
(A.1) Δy = ψ[E-1 – y-1]

0 < ψ <1

(A.2) E = ε0 + ε1y + ε2[iL – π] + ε3π + ε4B + ε5L-1 + ε6D-1
(A.3) π = ρ0 + ρ1y

ε0, ε1, ε3, ε4, ε6 > 0; ε2, ε5, < 0

ρ0 , ρ 1 > 0

(A.4) iL = iF + m
m0 > 0, m1 >< 0

(A.5) m = m0 + m1y
(A.6) B = L - L-1
(A.7) L = λ0 + λ1iL + λ2y

λ0 , λ2 > 0; λ1< 0

(A.8) D = δ0 + δ1iD + δ2q + δ3y

δ0, δ1, δ3 > 0; δ2 < 0

(A.9) iD = iF/[1 + k]β

k, β > 0

(A.10) L = [1 – k]D
Equation (A.1) describes the output adjustment process, which is driven by a Keynesian
excess demand mechanism. As discussed in the text, the equilibrium version of the model
can be reduced to a two equation system consisting of an IS (goods market equilibrium)
and LL (loan market equilibrium schedule).
Equation (A.1) – (A.3) describe the real economy and include the Phillips curve.
Equations (A.4) – (A.10) describe the financial sector, including the banking sector.
The dynamics of the model have the loan and stock markets always being in equilibrium,
but the goods market can be out of equilibrium and marked by excess demand. In effect,
the dynamics of the model have desired borrowing equal to actual borrowing and desired
portfolio holdings equal to actual portfolio holdings, but there can be excess demand in
goods markets. That excess demand drives future output adjustment.
Equations (A.3) – (A.10) can be used to solve the current values of iL, iD, and q. These
are given respectively by:
(A.11) iL = iF + m0 + m1y
(A.12) iD = iF/[1 + k]β = ziF

z = 1/[1 + k]β
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(A.13) q = {λ0 + λ1m0 - [1 – k]δ0 + [λ1 - [1 – k]δ1z]iF + [λ1m1 + λ2 - [1 – k]δ3]y}/[1 – k]δ2
Substituting equations (A.11) – (A.13) into equations (A.7) and (A.8) yields
(A.14) L = λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF] + [λ1m1+ λ2]y
(A.15) D = [λ0 + λ1m0]/[1-k] + λ1iF/[1-k] + [λ1m1 + λ2]y/[1-k]
Substituting (A.3), (A.6), (A.14), and (A.15), into equation (A.2) yields
(A.16) E = ε0 + ε2[iF + m0 – ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0 + λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k]
+ {ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}y - {ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]y-1
Lagging equation (A.16) yields
(A.17) E-1 = ε0 + ε2[iF + m0 – ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0 + λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k]
+ {ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}y-1 - {ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]y-2
Rearranging equation (A.1) yields
(A.1’) y = [1 -ψ]y-1 + ψ E-1
Substituting equation (A.17) into (A.1’) yields
(A.19) y = ψ{ε0 + ε2[iF + m0–ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0 + λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k]}
+ [1- ψ + ψ{ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}]y-1
- ψ{ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]y-2
Equation (A.19) can then be re-written as
(A.20) y = a0 + a1y-1+ a2y-2
where a0 = ψ{ε0 + ε2[iF+m0–ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0+λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0+λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k]}
a1 = 1- ψ + ψ{ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}
a2 = - ψ{ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]
The necessary and sufficient conditions for stability (Gandolfo, 1985, p.59) are
1 + a1 + a2 > 0
1 - a2 > 0
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1 - a1 + a2 > 0
Inspection of the stability condition reveals that the model can be stable or unstable,
depending on the parameter values. However, it is worth considering the case where
m1 < 0, ε4 is large, and |ε5| = |ε6|.
m1 < 0 implies the Minsky confidence effect dominates the loan congestion effect, so
that the loan rate mark-up falls as output expands. ε4 is large says that new borrowing
has a large positive impact on AD. |ε5| = |ε6| implies the absolute value of the AD
wealth effect of bank deposits and bank loons is the same.
These signings unambiguously imply a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. In this case if |a1| and |a2| are
both large, the stability condition 1 - a1 + a2 > 0 may be violated so that the model is
unstable.
The economic logic is simple. New borrowing strongly expands AD and output,
causing the loan rate mark-up and the loan rate to fall, in turn generating further
expansion of AD and output. Such a process is the hallmark of a Minskyian business
cycle.
Lastly, if AD is strongly sensitive to inflation (ε3 large) this also increases the
likelihood of instability by increasing the absolute value of a1. This is because of the
Tobin –Mundell effect whereby inflation causes agents to shift away from money and
increase spending, thereby further increasing AD and inflation.
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Figure 2. The Basic Model
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Figure 3.b. Positively sloped LL
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Figure 3.c. N egatively sloped LL
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Figure 4: Determination of the money supply and stock prices
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